Evolution and the Prevention of Violent Crime by Roach, Jason & Pease, Ken
University of Huddersfield Repository
Roach, Jason and Pease, Ken
Evolution and the Prevention of Violent Crime
Original Citation
Roach, Jason and Pease, Ken (2011) Evolution and the Prevention of Violent Crime. Psychology, 2 
(4). pp. 393-404. ISSN 2152-7180
This version is available at http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/13779/
The University Repository is a digital collection of the research output of the
University, available on Open Access. Copyright and Moral Rights for the items
on this site are retained by the individual author and/or other copyright owners.
Users may access full items free of charge; copies of full text items generally
can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any
format or medium for personal research or study, educational or not-for-profit
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided:
• The authors, title and full bibliographic details is credited in any copy;
• A hyperlink and/or URL is included for the original metadata page; and
• The content is not changed in any way.
For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please
contact the Repository Team at: E.mailbox@hud.ac.uk.
http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/
1 
 
 
Evolution and the Prevention of Violent Crime 
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Huddersfield University 
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Loughborough University 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper suggests how violence prevention can be better informed by embracing an 
evolutionary approach to understanding and preventing violent crime. Here, ethical crime 
control through an evolutionary lens is considered and speculation is offered as to what 
an evolution-evidenced crime reduction programme might look like. The paper begins 
with an outline of the current landscape of crime prevention scholarship within 
criminology and presents some possible points of contact with actual or possible violence 
reduction practice, including child homicide and violence against women. The paper 
concludes with suggestions for an ethical research agenda for reducing violence, whereby 
it is hoped that an audience of open-minded criminologists and diverse students of 
evolution may lend a hand in increasing the sophistication of the criminological study of 
violence prevention.    
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Introduction 
 
Criminology generally is justly criticized for its theoretic insularity, and in particular its 
general hostility towards or neglect of approaches other than that of sociological 
determinism (Pease 2010; Roach and Pease, in press). Its journals tend to be titled 
according to geography or methodological focus (eg European Journal of Criminology, 
Journal of Quantitative Criminology). There are few cross-discipline titles characteristic 
of faster-advancing disciplines, and cited references tend to be older and more often book 
based than one finds in livelier branches of scholarship. When one of the present authors 
told a distinguished professor of mainstream criminology that he was co-writing the 
present paper, the reply was a derisive ‘You’re better than that’.  
 
Insofar as systematic attempts at crime reduction take their theory from academic 
criminology, evolutionary perspectives are therefore predictably marginal or absent.  In 
the near eight hundred pages of Nick Tilley’s authoritative edited ‘Handbook of Crime 
Prevention and Community Safety’ (Tilley 2005), evolution is mentioned once, in a 
chapter by the second author (Pease 2005). It is not mentioned at all elsewhere, even in 
the chapter on violent and sexual crime (Maguire and Brookman 2005). It would be 
tedious to rehearse the absence of evolution as a topic from all other leading recent texts 
on crime prevention, such as Welsh and Farrington (2006) and Tilley (2010).  Attempts 
to translate evolutionary insights into social policy have an unhappy history. Many social 
scientists may thus feel it prudent to avoid such contributions as it may make. For 
example, in 2008 when the authors asked attendees at the British Society of Criminology 
annual conference to complete a short questionnaire asking for their opinion on the utility 
of evolutionary thinking in criminology, only a derisory fifteen per cent condescended to 
do so, and most of those who did, considered it to be irrelevant to criminology.  
 
Tooby and Cosmides (1990) define evolutionary psychology as, psychology which 
centres on the fact that the structure of the human mind, which has been inherited, and 
represents the product of evolutionary processes (i.e. natural and sexual selection). Put 
more simply, what we can do today is a direct result of what was needed to be done in 
order to increase our ancestors’ survival and reproductive chances in the past. What as 
humans we are able to do today, therefore, is a direct result of the evolution of our 
species - namely how our ancestors adapted to their environment. Genes being simply the 
method of transmission between generations. 
 
Evolutionary psychologists seek ‘functional’ explanations for behaviour. For example, 
why a particular human behaviour, ability or characteristic has evolved, and not causal 
explanations, focused on immediate precursors or causes of that behaviour, in the 
environment in which it occurs (Smith and Stevens, 2002). This is a rapid departure from, 
for example, behaviourist psychology and environmental criminology, where it is the 
immediate environment which is of primary focus. Evolutionary psychologists focus 
instead on the distant past, attempting to locate the function of certain behaviours in our 
evolutionary past by looking at our ancestors. Smith and Stevens (2002), for example, 
pose the question, why is it human beings have evolved spoken language when other 
close primates, such as chimpanzees, have not? Many other aspects of chimpanzee 
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physiology (including a 95% DNA match) are similar, so what were the evolutionary 
pressures that supported the ability to develop and use language in humans only? 
Evolutionary psychologists adopt reverse engineering in seeking answers to questions 
such as this (Tooby and Cosmides, 1990).  
 
An ‘evolutionary informed criminology of the sort called for in this article, should 
consider how distal factors (such as displays of aggression related to sexual competition 
and fitness among young men) interact with the more proximal (e.g. crowded, noisy bars 
full of young men) and how this can inform violence prevention strategies and 
interventions. We call for an ‘evolutionary informed criminological’ approach to 
violence, which, therefore, considers how distal and proximal factors contribute and 
interact when explaining (and preventing) criminal behaviour, referred to as Gene x 
Environment (G x E) effects. Caspi and colleagues’ wonderful example of the interaction 
between expression of the MAOA gene and violent behaviour is presented later in the 
article (Caspi et al. 2002). 
 
 
Eugenics and social Darwinism apart, the central objection of criminologists to accepting 
evolutionary insights seems to be that crime, including violent crime, is a social 
construct, and explaining a socially constructed phenomenon in biosocial or evolutionary 
terms constitutes a category error. This objection is not a powerful one. To adopt and 
adapt the Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) characterization in their general theory, crime 
can be seen as actions seeking to gain advantage over conspecifics by force or fraud. 
Minor definitional tweaking is necessary to exclude sanctioned combat sport and warfare, 
but the vast bulk of criminal law reflects this, consisting of more or less tightly worded 
proscriptions of intra-species advantage-taking by force or fraud. Violent crime 
represents the first of these means of securing advantage. This is not of course to say that 
most attempts to gain advantage by force or fraud are treated, still less processed, as 
breaches of criminal law. More such attempts probably occur in a day’s playground 
bullying or questionable sales techniques than in a century’s processed crimes, even in 
societies that would see themselves as governed by the rule of law. Neither is it the case 
that law is equally applied cross-nationally, with violence against women representing a 
particularly troubling case in point (see Weldon 2002). There are tautologies involved in 
the linkage of evolutionary thought and what counts as a crime. Criminal law is enacted 
for forms of behaviour which are deemed to be too serious or disruptive of social order to 
be dealt with by citizens informally or via civil law. There is no need to enact criminal 
laws in respect of behaviours which no-one wants to perform, or which harm only the 
behaver. There is no law against coprophagia, for example. Matters are more complex 
than this, given a religious underpinning to the criminal law which has in the past 
forbidden suicide, for instance. Nonetheless, it is tenable to assert that criminal law 
proscribes those actions which selection pressures of the environment of evolutionary 
adaptedness (EEA) gave some or all of us the inclination to perform, as the EEA-derived 
equivalent of Original Sin. Insofar as this is the case, crime reduction constitutes an 
attempt to curb or sublimate evolution-derived predatory actions. As Owen Jones (2005) 
notes, law is “a tool for moving human animals to behave in ways they would not 
otherwise behave if left solely to their own devices” (p953). Of course this also applies to 
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education and regulated sport, as well as to the behaviour of both the offender and the 
preventer. Jones framed the ‘law of law’s leverage’ as follows 
 
“The magnitude of legal intervention necessary to reduce or to increase the 
incidence of any human behaviour will correlate positively or negatively, with the 
extent to which such a predisposition contributing to that behaviour was adaptive 
for its bearers, on average, in past environments” (p962) 
 
Save for a quibble with the insertion of legal as the fourth word in Jones’ law (since most 
effective interventions seem to consist in the manipulation of opportunities rather than 
weight of legal response) the point is well made.  That said, criminal law has to be seen 
as an attempt to produce behaviour different from what it would be were selection 
pressures to have their way unimpeded. Effective laws against murder or dangerous 
driving, for example, alter selection advantage for those who do not waste their 
reproductive years in prison (and careful pedestrians). This, of course, represents a crude 
position. And the application to problems of violent crime of memetics as a form of 
evolutionary thinking would yield a more sophisticated perspective.  Indeed, a wholly 
different perspective could be taken on the issue by concentrating on enhancing 
cooperation rather than reducting its antithesis, agonistic behaviour. While this approach 
was seriously considered, given the extensive current work from that perspective (see for 
example Nowack 2011) it was rejected for no better reason that the length of the piece 
was already unwieldy and the deadline for its submission past.             
   
Having thus excluded the option of ‘accentuating the positive’ in favour of seeking to 
‘eliminate the negative’ iwhat, then, can the present article hope to contribute? It aspires 
(very diffidently) to consider ethical crime control through an evolutionary lens, and 
thereby to invite the deployment of evolution insights in criminology journals and crime 
reduction practice, and to speculate what an evolution-evidenced crime reduction 
programme might look like. To that end, it will 
 
1. Outline the current landscape of crime prevention scholarship within 
criminology, with the hope of eliciting contributions from those with expertise in 
evolution science; and 
2. Present some possible points of contact with actual or possible violence reduction 
practice, by reference to extant literature in evolutionary psychology and 
criminology. 
    
The hoped for audiences are open-minded criminologists and diverse students of 
evolution who may lend a hand in increasing the sophistication of the criminological 
study of violence prevention. Given these aims, it is perhaps inevitable that some ideas 
will be seen as banal, others as tendentious. Successful crime reduction approaches must, 
arguably, be conistent with evolutionary thought, otherwise they would not have been 
successful. To anticipate a conclusion, attempts to change those embarked upon a 
criminal career based upon presumptions of pathology enjoy limited success relative to 
those based upon common perceptions of crime opportunities.  Evolutionary insights are 
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sought primarily in relation to how people understand and respond to violence-
precipitating situations.    
 
In what follows, violent crime prevention refers to the preclusion, by ethically defensible 
means, of individual violent offending acts. Harm reduction involves the reduction of 
harmful consequences in unprevented violent acts.  
 
Crime reduction: the state of the art.   
 
The conventional classification of crime reduction distinguishes primary, secondary and 
tertiary methods.  This best-known categorization was devised by Brantingham and Faust 
(1976). Primary prevention reduces crime opportunities without reference to 
characteristics of criminals or potential criminals. Secondary prevention seeks to change 
people, typically those at high risk of embarking upon a criminal career. Tertiary 
prevention works by the truncation of a criminal career, in length, seriousness, or 
frequency of offending. The Brantingham and Faust classification was later refined by 
Van Dijk and de Waard (1991) and remains useful. Primary prevention has focused upon 
proximal causes or precipitators of the crime event, and can be criticized for neglect of 
distal ‘causes’. However, this is a matter of convenience and immediate utility, rather 
than being intrinsic in the definition. Primary prevention simply assumes a supply of 
motivated potential offenders, and changes the circumstances which realize the latent 
criminality. While this has typically involved place design, hot spot management, and 
other such factors, it does not in logic exclude structural factors of evolutionary interest, 
such as the gender composition of populations. Indeed, the origins of routine activity 
theory, which underpins much primary prevention, lie in the linkage of distal factors such 
as the lengthening of childhood dependency and general access to goods. Thus primary 
prevention is here used to include all approaches which are person-neutral, ie which does 
not seek or target individuals according to their present or predicted criminality. Primary 
prevention also sits more easily with the public health perspective favoured by the World 
Health Organisation (see Krug et al. 2002).    
 
Primary crime prevention has some advantages over rival approaches in terms of the weight 
of evidence brought to bear in its support, and in terms of the slightness of the level of social 
engineering often necessary for its implementation in its proximal form. Underpinning the 
approach, as noted above, is the routine activities theory of Marcus Felson (2002), in which 
an offender who is ready, willing and able encounters, seeks out or engineers a crime 
situation comprising a vulnerable and attractive target of crime, in a favourable environment 
and in the absence of motivated and capable preventers. Routine activities theory was 
initially developed to address the paradox of increased urban violence at a time when social 
conditions deemed relevant improved (Cohen and Felson 1979). These authors saw 
predatory crime as a by-product of routine activities, in particular the dispersion of activities 
away from home and family.     
 
If crime, especially violent crime, is simply the natural work of evil or damaged people, 
then convicting and incapacitating evil and damaged people lies at the heart of police 
work. For those of the left politically, the emphasis is on the remediation of damage to 
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the person, deemed to have been occasioned through deprivation of one kind or another. 
Marcus Felson (1994) refers to this as the ‘pestilence fallacy’, which asserts that bad 
things come from other bad things. He writes: 
 
Why was the major period of crime rate increase in the United States 1963 to 
1975, also a period of healthy economic growth and relatively low 
unemployment? Why did Sweden’s crime rates increase greatly as its Social 
Democratic government brought more and more programmes to enhance equality 
and protect the poor? (pp. 11–12). 
 
Felson concludes that ‘crime seems to march to its own drummer’, and that the richness 
of crime opportunities is the crucial factor which determines the beat. This is a 
conclusion of fundamental importance for crime reduction, suggesting that the regulation 
of the supply of crime opportunities is central to the reduction enterprise.  
 
The common criticism by scholars in the biological sciences of the application of 
evolutionary ideas to behaviour and its regulation is best known as simply retailing ‘Just 
So’ stories, speculative and unconstrained by evidence (see for example Coyne (2009). 
Our riposte is that much of criminology has consisted of Just-So stories of sociological 
origin, to the point where the discipline of criminology is fragmented and possibly in 
terminal decline (see for example Loader and Sparks 2010). If evolutionary concepts turn 
out to have no more than heuristic value in designing research and crime-reductive 
practice, it will be no worse than what has gone before. If it turns out that successful 
crime reduction can be derived from and is consistent with such concepts, a new direction 
for criminology will have been signposted.  Co-evolution has already been used as a 
simile for the ‘arms race’ between offenders and purveyors of primary prevention 
(Ekblom 1997, 1999),ii and some primary prevention techniques have apparently been 
inspired by animal defence mechanisms, for example the squid’s deployment of opaque 
fluid when under attack.iii Felson (2006) devotes a chapter of his book ‘Crime and 
Nature’ to ‘Crime’s First Defences’. Understanding offender foraging behaviour has 
informed optimal police deployment (Johnson et al. 2009). 
 
Primary Violent Crime Prevention: Can Evolutionary Thinking Contribute?  
 
The renowned astrophysicist Stephen Hawking argued in April 2010 that we should 
avoid making contact with extraterrestrial life forms. The media reported this in 
somewhat xenophobic terms (if that word can be applied to extra-terrestrials). The more 
misanthropic truth was revealed by his remark that "We only have to look at ourselves to 
see how intelligent life might develop into something we wouldn't want to meet."iv 
 
As Buss and Shackelford (1997) point out, the ubiquity of human violence cannot be 
explained solely by the variables of usual criminological interest. Although of no little 
importance, the question whether violence has roots as an adaptive strategy that once 
increased reproductive success, it is not the brief for this article, it being specifically 
about prevention. The age crime curve and the preponderance of male violence are 
perhaps the two central facts about the distribution of criminality. Self-reported and 
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recorded offending, both violent and other, peak in the late teens and are higher for males 
at every age. The claim that the age-crime relationship is invariant across epoch and 
culture (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983) is roughly true, with the exceptions being of equal 
interest as the generality. For example Zhong (2005) showed that in a period of rapid 
economic development in Taiwan, the age-crime curve peaked earlier for property but 
not for violent offending, which Zhong ascribes to the continuity of Chinese ‘culture’ 
over the period. 
 
Robert Wright (1994) asserts that the leading cause of violence is maleness, to which 
may be added youth and unmarried status (see Mesquida and Wiener 1996. 1999).  In 
brief, violence is often about sexual selection. The classic psychological theory of 
violence is the frustration-aggression hypothesis, which holds that aggression is the 
response to the expected interference with a desired goal (Dollard et al. 1939, see also 
Berkowittz’s 1989 reformulation). Stressing the primacy of sexual selection as the root of 
frustration is the distinctive contribution of evolutionary thinking. If that insight holds, 
there seem to be two strategies which fit into the primary prevention category, two distal, 
two  proximal. The distal tactic concerns establishing sex ratios or sexual mores which do 
not deny sexual expression among male adolescents and young adults. As Gottschall 
(2008) opines,  
 
“…a real shortage of female reproductive capacity, relative to male demand, is 
endemic to the human condition. In this shortage lies the answer as to why men 
fight… sexual selection has shaped men to compete for women and for concrete 
material resources and for intangible social resources because… these resources 
[are] reliably converted to reproductive advantage” (p48-49).   
 
It is entirely unrealistic to suppose that sex ratios at birth should be manipulated in the 
interests of the prevention of later violent crime. Indeed, since the female population 
defines effective reproductive channel capacity, the population implications of such a 
strategy would be horrendous.   
 
The second distal approach would involve an attempt to reduce anticipations of lifetime 
failure amongst adolescent males. Daly and Wilson (2005) note the higher rate of future 
discounting (in effect preferring short over long term rewards) among males and among 
the young (paradocically, given the increasing uncertainty of the future as one gets older).  
They note the greater variability of reproductive outcome among males, and the resulting 
competition amongst males. After justifying rate of homicide as a proxy for inter-male 
competition, they find homicide to be most frequent amongst those with least to lose, 
unemployed and unmarried men, with divorced and widowed men reverting to higher 
rates of homicide, Characterising the deployment of reproductive effort as a gamble, 
anticipation of the high probability of an early death or other form of removal from the 
reproductively active is consistent with the choice of a strategy of attempting risky and 
frequent impregnation. While plausibly argued, it is difficult to think of viable social 
policies which would substantially inflate the residual reproductive value of young men 
which would not be justified more powerfully by other egalitarian arguments.  
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 The impracticality of both distal options makes the proximal ones more important. 
 
The proximal tactics concern 
 
1. the nudgeability of human behaviour 
2. harm reduction (here treated as a form of primary prevention), whereby the 
affordance or means for translating violent intent into injury or death are denied 
those likely to exhibit such intent 
 
These will be dealt with in turn. 
 
Over the past 25 years or so there has been a gradually increasing recognition of the 
possibilities offered by focusing on crime events rather than on offenders (Gilling 1997; 
Crawford 1998).Overstating the case only slightly, the evidence for the success of 
intelligently conceived and well-implemented primary prevention (Clarke 1992, 1997; 
Goldblatt and Lewis 1998; Sherman et al. 1998; Tilley 2010) is very substantial. Such 
success is consistent with situational rather than dispositional theories in social 
psychology. The capacity of slight changes in setting to evoke substantial changes in 
behaviour represents a well-established tradition in social psychology, with Walter 
Mischel (1968) a pioneer. Mischel's analyses revealed that the individual’s behavior, 
when closely examined, was highly dependent upon situational cues, rather than 
expressed consistently across diverse situations that differed in meaning. A neglected 
feature of Stanley Milgram’s obedience studies was his manipulation of the proximity of 
the person apparently administering electric shocks and the person to whom they were 
administered, which yielded massive changes in the intensity of shocks they could be 
induced to administer (see Milgram 1977). Momentous decisions (such as committing 
suicide) are remarkably changeable by removing one means of doing so, by making 
domestic gas supplies non-toxic (Clarke and Mayhew 1988),  installing catalytic 
converters to vehicles (Lester and Clarke 1989), and restricting the size of paracetomol 
and aspirin packets (Hawton et al. 2001).  More recently Zimbardo (2007) develops the 
point. Thaler and Ornstein (2008) rename the situational determinant the ‘nudge’ and 
apply it widely to social policy.  Human nudgeability, and the capacity to afford multiple 
uses for objects, it seems embarrassingly obvious to relate, is a consequence of the human 
evolutionary route, whereby a wide range of environments become habitable by dint of 
behavioural flexibility and innovation. The longstanding recognition of the fact of 
imitative learning, and the more recent exciting research and speculation about mirror 
neurons as the basis of such learning, including the imitation of prosocial behaviour (see 
Thomson 2010 for an introduction).   
 
 
Turning to harm reduction, the concept of affordance provides one way of thinking about 
the situational specificity of behaviour alluded to earlier, and permits the elaboration of 
the concept of opportunity. The original Gibsonian (1950) meaning of affordance 
concerned things that you could actually do with objects. An object’s affordance 
comprised what one could do with it.  Don Norman (eg 1998) extended this to perceived 
affordance, ie actions that the thing suggested you do with them. Ekblom and Sidebottom 
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(2007) describe it in the crime opportunity context as an offender’s capacity to see utility 
in an object. While doing participant observation in an ex-prisoner’s hostel, one of the 
writers observed a fight break out very quickly and a heavy glass ashtray was wielded as 
a weapon. To the writer, it had just been an ashtray a moment before! Baseball bats 
‘afford’ thoughts of violence more than cricket bats, and are sold in all large British 
sports stores, despite the fact that baseball is played very little in the UK. The position on 
glass as a weapon and on gun availability is more difficult to summarise. Conventional 
(annealed) drinking glasses or bottles, when broken, yield sharp edges capable of 
inflicting serious injuries. Such events are generally known as glassings. Toughened glass 
shatters on impact, and is relatively useless as a weapon. Yet a randomised controlled 
trial showed 60% more injuries from toughened glass than from annealed glass. The 
conclusion was reached that glass with lower impact resistance caused more injuries. 
“Toughened” glassware had lower impact resistance. Standards for toughening need to be 
developed. (Warburton and Shepherd 2000, see also Coomaraswamy and Shepherd 
2003).  Subsequent analysis showed that this counterintuitive result was a consequence of 
the greater resistance to breakage of annealed glasses, which occasioned the plea for 
revised standards for toughening (not developed at the time of writing). While the results 
were obviously disappointing, paradoxically they do illustrate that weapon characteristics 
were relevant to the degree of harm inflicted. For instance, assaults with bottles caused 
less severe injuries than assaults with drinking glasses.  In a local initiative in Liverpool 
in 1997, a set of simple measures preventing glasses and bottles being taken onto the 
street reduced the rate of glassings by some 50%v 
 
The media characterise Swiss gun crime as low, despite the wide availability of weapons 
by military reservists. However Killias (1993) found that Switzerland has five times as 
many homicides committed with guns as Great Britain versus only a slightly higher non-
gun homicide rate. His explanation for the lack of gun use in other crime is that the 
military weapons that are kept in Swiss households are of little use to ordinary criminals, 
because they are heavy and far too long to be concealed under a coat or in a case. 
Zimring and Hawkins (1987) contend that the firearm effect consists in escalating 
consequences. They provide data on altercations involving knives far less often result in 
death, for example. Lott (2005) argues that the power-equalising effects of handguns is 
neglected in statistics.  He uses national victimization survey to assert that women 
without a gun resisting attack are some four times greater than women resisting with a 
gun. The male difference is smaller but in the same direction. Grossman (2009) notes the 
relationship between remoteness of assailant to target enabled by modern weaponry and 
psychological ease of assault. He notes that changes in the realism of targets used during 
weapons training will affect rate of fire in battle. A historical nod in the direction of 
Konrad Lorenz is necessary. To him we owe the insight that animals with the most 
fearsome natural weapons are those with the best developed behavioural inhibitions on 
lethal assault. He wrote 
 
“…all heavily-armed carnivores possess sufficiently reliable inhibitions which 
prevent the self-destruction of the species. … No selection pressures arose in the 
prehistory of mankind to breed inhibitory mechanisms preventing the killing of 
conspecifics” (Lorenz 1966 p233). 
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It is perhaps not too much of a stretch to say that the paucity of natural inhibitions on the 
expression of violence is consistent with the primary reduction focus on limiting the 
precipitating circumstances of violence and the weapons availability which set limits on 
the amount of harm done in violent attacks. Certainly some of the major examples of 
successful practice are of this type. These include place-oriented approaches to gun 
crime. Braga (2003) writes, with supporting research, that  
 
“Officers can reduce gun crime by changing the features, facilities, and management of 
problem places. For example, if problem analysis reveals that easy access to common 
areas in front of a high school causes youth gun crimes to be clustered there immediately 
upon school release, police should experiment with ways to limit access to these areas 
during problem times. The practice of problem-oriented policing is still developing, and 
additional research is needed on different approaches to controlling gun violence hot 
spots”. vi 
 
 Violence at pubs and bars is reduced (Scott and Dedel 2006) by maintaining   
 
 “A comfortable and entertaining atmosphere reduces both frustration and boredom 
among patrons, which can reduce aggression levels. Lighting should not be so bright that 
it acts as an irritant, but also not so dim that it can conceal customers’ activities.[70] An 
important environmental consideration is the crowding level. Police in some jurisdictions 
enforce occupancy limits (primarily adopted for fire safety) as a means to control the bar 
crowding that can lead to fights. Redesigning a bar’s interior to improve traffic flow and 
prevent congestion can reduce the opportunities for accidental bumps and drink spills that 
may escalate into fights”. vii 
 
While such conclusions may seem self-evident, they do illustrate that manipulable 
aspects of the immediate environment can nudge behaviour from violence and/or reduce 
harm.  Some sixty-four design guides on crime reduction, about a third addressing 
violence, have been published by the Centre for Problem-Oriented Policing 
(http://www.popcenter.org/) and are worth consulting to gain an impression of the range 
and types of problem in which demonstration projects have found place manipulation to 
be effective.   
 
Secondary Violent Crime Prevention         
 
It will be recalled that secondary prevention is oriented towards those who may be 
particularly prone to develop problematic behaviour. Aggressive behaviour appears very 
young and is characterized by high stability coefficients across many years (Olweus 
1979). Serbin and Karp (2003) reported that aggression (and depression) in primary 
school aged girls were predictive of aggression amongst their children. Of course the 
mechanisms may have no evolutionary relevance, but this does mean that there is reason 
for secondary intervention, particularly since aggression was linked with a variety of 
other unhappinesses in the lives of aggressors (Junget et al. 2007).  
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Many lines of research in evolutionary psychology have clear implications for secondary 
violence prevention. The two most obvious are selected for attention here.  One is the 
evidence for apparent gene-specific effects of environment on the development of violent 
people. The second concerns the particular risks to children associated with step-
parentage.  
 
In her admirable, unfashionable classic The Nurture Assumption, Judith Rich Harris 
(1998) contends that the contributions which parents make to their children’s 
development primarily comprise their genes and where they decide to set up home. She 
points out that in the socialization literature, the effects of parenting styles are 
confounded with those of shared genes. She reviews the literature on the relationship 
between parent characteristics and child characteristics and demonstrates that either the 
same characteristics must have different and largely unpredictable effects on children, or 
that those influences are largely illusory. Is poor parenting a risk factor in a child’s 
development, or do parents tending to (for example) impulsivity, transmit that attribute 
through the conventional genetic means?  
 
Familial inheritance is always both the result of genetic endowment and environment, but 
environments are made, and are often correlated with the dispositions of those who 
inhabit them. Moffitt and Caspi suggest with regard to antisocial behaviour; 
 
“Environments are provoked by a person’s genetically influenced behavior, or a 
person chooses environments consonant with her genotype, or a person’s 
genotype results in him selectively finding himself in certain environments” 
(2006, p127) 
 
 
The implications of Rich Harris’s work are profound. They should be no surprise to those 
familiar with the earlier literature on criminality and biology (see, for example, Mednick 
and Christiansen 1977). The latter authors demonstrated that criminality in the biological 
parent is reflected in a higher prevalence of criminality in the child, whatever the criminal 
record status of the adoptive parent. More recent work under the flag of 
neurocriminology has looked in detail at brain functioning, conditioning and criminality 
(see for example Gao et al. (2010).  
 
Some scholars suggest that searches for answers to questions such as these have led to a 
preoccupation with ‘risk factors’ that often confuse correlates with causes;   
‘Influential reviewers have concluded that the study of antisocial behaviour has 
been stuck in the ‘risk-factor’ stage (Farrington, 1988, 2003; Hinshaw, 2002; 
Rutter, 2003a, 2003b) because so few studies have used designs that are able to 
document causality (Rutter et al., 2001). A variable is called a ‘risk factor’ if it 
has a documented predictive relation with antisocial outcomes, whether or not the 
association is causal’. (Moffitt and Caspi , 2006, p109). 
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Arguing whether behaviour is a result of biological characteristics or specific 
environmental experiences was likely the result of misdirection (Suomi, 2009). More 
exciting is the realization by many that both genetic (nature) and environmental (nurture) 
factors play crucial roles (e.g. Collins et al., 2000) and indeed both often interact to shape 
behaviour and its individual development (e.g. Rutter, 2001).  
One illustration of the importance of understanding behaviour (including violence) from 
a gene x environment interaction perspective (hereafter, G X E) is provided by studies 
with rhesus monkeys. It has been consistently shown that it those that have been reared 
by peers and not their biological mothers, appear much more ‘anxious in nature’ and 
excessively ‘fearful’ than their ‘mother-reared’ counterparts’ (Suomi, 1991; 1995). 
Indeed longitudinal studies have shown that male ‘peer-reared’ monkeys consistently 
exhibit more extreme behaviours (and with increased frequency) such as being overly 
aggressive and overly impulsive, than those reared by biological mothers (Suomi, 
1991:2009).  
So how can adopting evolutionary thought help explain such G x E interactions? Put 
briefly, we can surmise that those reared by peers and not their mothers, do not have their 
aggressive survival impulses attenuated. Indeed a predisposition to aggression and 
violence would be considered vital to survival in an environment where access to food 
and reproductive partners is hotly contested with rival male peers. With those fortunate to 
be raised by their mothers having their early nutritional and protection needs provided for 
in their formative years at least. 
So should predictions of such behaviour by rhesus monkeys be based simply on an 
identification of early-rearing environments and not on gene x environment interactions?  
The short answer is no as recent research points to such identifiable differences in 
behaviour between male ‘peer-reared’ and ‘mother reared’ monkeys as being more the 
result of gene x environment interaction rather than just early-rearing experience alone 
(Suomi, 2009). 
 
The neurotransmitter serotonin is posited to be an important consideration when 
explaining unusual and extreme behaviour. More specifically, the occurrence of certain 
mental health problems, such as anxiety and depression, alongside behaviours such as 
fear, aggression and violence, has long been associated with decreased serotonergic 
functioning. The serotonin transporter gene (5-HTT) is generally held responsible for 
such a decrease in functioning when it occurs (Lesch et al. 1996), because it has ‘a length 
variation in its promoter region that results in allelic variation in serotonin expression’ 
(Suomi, 2009:17). Heils et al. (1996) distinguish ‘long allele’ (LL) from ‘short allele’ 
(LS), with the latter raising the possibility of decreased serotonergic functioning and 
therefore, an increase in the likelihood of aggressive and violent behaviour. 
 
Barr et al. (2003) found a ‘buffering effect’ which appeared to mitigate some of the 
monkeys with the LS allele from the full effects of decreased serotonergic functioning, 
according to their early-rearing experience. Where high levels of aggression was 
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observed in peer-reared monkeys with the LS allele, for mother-reared monkeys with the 
LS allele it was not, demonstrating an important interaction between genes and 
environment. Put simply, the consequences for these monkeys of having the notorious LS 
allele appear to differ dramatically according to whether the monkeys were raised by 
peers or whether they were buffered from its effects by being raised by their biological 
mothers. Suomi (2009) summarises the significance of this finding rather nicely; 
 
Indeed, it could be argued on the basis of these findings that having the LS allele 
may well lead to psychopathology among monkeys with poor early rearing 
histories but might actually be adaptive for monkeys who develop secure early 
attachment relationship with their mothers’ (p18) 
 
In sum, compelling evidence is presented that genetic and early experience factors in 
interaction affect a monkey’s capacity to regulate expression of fear and aggression 
(Suomi, 2009), with important implications for our own species; 
             
“Clearly, the context in which development takes place matters a great deal for 
rhesus monkeys.    It is hard to imagine how it could be less so for human 
development”. (Suomi , 2009, p19). 
 
 
The importance of interactions is lent support by the work of Terrie Moffitt and her 
collaborators (see Moffitt 1993, 1997, 2003) whose distinction of adolescent-limited and 
life-course persistent offenders casts the latter as predisposed as a result of inherited 
and/or early acquired neuropsychological deficit. Of particular current interest is the gene 
variant MOAO which lowers the activity of the enzyme monoamine oxidase A and which 
seems implicated in violence. This relationship is stronger amongst maltreated children 
(see Caspi et al. 2002). Of course, reflecting Rich Harris’s insights, it is not necessarily 
the case that maltreatment activates the propensity to violence. Equally plausible is the 
notion that MOAO and other as yet to be identified violence-relevant genes drive both 
parental violence (in the form of maltreatment) and child aggression. In path terms, the 
message is simply that one ignores at one’s peril genetic or other early factors disposing 
to preferences. Kim-Cohen et al (2006) conducted a replication and meta-analysis and 
concluded “These findings provide the strongest evidence to date that the MAOA gene 
influences vulnerability to environmental stress, and that this biological process can be 
initiated early in life” (p903).  Widom and Brzustowicz (2006) found the effect in white 
children only, adding a further interactive complication.   
The relevant research has not been slow to make its way into the courtroom. Bernet et al. 
(2007) describe their own experience and anticipate future developments as follows 
 
“It seems possible that both the defence and the prosecution may be interested in 
introducing evidence regarding a defendant’s life experiences and genetic make-up to a 
jury. In a case of aggravated assault, for instance, the prosecution may say that a 
defendant has violent tendencies (based on the person’s genotype conveying low MAOA 
activity and a history of severe child mistreatment) and should be removed from society 
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for as long as possible. On the other hand, the defence may say during the sentencing 
phase of a first-degree murder case that a person’s genotype and history of severe abuse 
during childhood is mitigating” (p8).   
 
It is telling that the work of the Moffitt-Caspi team and its replication has been applied to 
the court literature before the child protection literature (as far as the writers have been 
able to determine after questioning relevant domain experts). What are the implications 
for child protection? We may discard the notion of being indifferent to the parental 
practices of those children whose genotypes afford them some protection against the 
acquisition of violent personalities! Rather it places an extra premium on ensuring as far 
as possible the quality of child care generally. Not to do so is effectively to collude in 
allowing preventable harm which compounds the effects of the genetic lottery itself. A 
parallel may perhaps be drawn with phenylketonuria (PKU), where screening on neonates 
allows management, and avoidance of the progressive mental impairment which 
otherwise ensues.  
 
A brief aside can perhaps be permitted. It has been speculated that the mechanism 
underlying the MAOA-abuse interaction may be epigenetic in nature.  Kramer (2005) 
defines epigenetics as “the study of stable alterations in gene expression by nongenetic 
mechanisms resulting in stable alterations in phenotype” (p16). In an astonishingly 
prescient article, Kendler and Eaves (1986) anticipate the essential facts of epigenetics, 
focusing on sensitivity to the environment. This, both in the sense of responsivity to the 
cues which make primary crime reduction effective, and in the particular sense of 
empathy (or its lack, see Baron-Cohen 2011) will be a crucial point of departure for 
research which seeks to link applied criminology and evolution.     
 
Speculatively, epigenesis makes evolutionary sense in a wide number of cognitive and 
affective contexts. This form of gene regulation is primarily under matrilineal control and 
has evolved partly to co-ordinate in-utero development with maternal resource 
availability (Keverne and Curley 2008). A detailed general introduction to epigenetics is 
to be found in Allis, Jenuwein and Reinberg (2007)..Szyf et al (2009) provide a clear 
brief account of the methylation and other events underpinning epigenesis, and report 
research on putative epigenetic effects on maternal care, and preliminary work on 
epigenesis and lifetime trajectories of aggressive behaviour.    
 
In respect of violence, epigenetic effects which favour agonistic behaviour only in 
environments in which parents had exhibited similar behaviour towards them, makes 
intuitive sense, and its neglect culpable. Kramer (2005) contends 
 
“…the future of child and adolescent psychiatry is ethically connected to the 
developmental processes designed by natural selection and inherited by way of evolution. 
For anything resembling the continuation of normal human interactions and normal 
family-centred developmental processes, our work should be inter-woven with the 
complex interactions occurring between the epigenome and the phenotype” (p 297).   
 
The same could certainly be said of criminology. The defensible next step will be to 
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reanalyze longitudinal studies of criminality (the Cambridge study now incorporates data 
from three generations) to test epigenetic hypotheses.  
       
Preventing child homicide? 
 
For most people, the killing of a child is felt to be the most heinous and distressing of all 
crimes (Adler and Polk, 2001). It is mercifully rarer for children to be victims of 
homicide than adults. In England and Wales there will be approximately 110 child 
homicides per year from an average total number of approximately 700 recorded 
homicides, roughly equating to 14% of all homicide victims (Brookman, 2005).  Quite 
understandably, child homicide provokes the most outrage from the public (Adler and 
Polk, 2001). As a category of crime it has also been identified as an important influence 
on public confidence in law enforcement (Innes 2003)  
 
Gene-centred evolution-based speculation (as no doubt elaborated elsewhere in this issue) 
would suggest that kinship would reduce child killings, and those in a parenting role 
without a kin relationship would be more induced to kill, This should be particularly true 
of  de facto ‘fathers’  since effort spent nurtuting someone else’s children would retract 
from available future reproductive attention.  Daly and Wilson (1988) in a ground-
breaking study of child homicides in the US concluded that children were approximately 
100 times more likely to be killed by a ‘non-biological parent’ (e.g. step-parent, cohabitee 
or boyfriend/girlfriend of a biological parent) than a biological one. Similar findings have 
since been found in other parts of the world including Canada (Daly and Wilson, 1998) 
and Australia (Adler and Polk, 2001). In Canada, Daly and Wilson (1988, 1998) found a 
co-residing step-parent was approximately seventy times more likely to kill a child under 
two years of age than a co-residing genetic parent..  
 
Creighton (1989), in a report produced for the children’s charity the NSPCC (the 
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children), found that in England and 
Wales for the period 1983-1987 almost a third of those recorded as victims of 
intentionally inflicted physical injuries lived with one ‘natural’ (biological) and one 
‘substitute’ (non-biological) parent. A random sample of children within the same age-
range from the wider population of England and Wales would have comprised only three 
percent (Daly and Wilson, 1998).  
 
In support of Daly and Wilson’s (1988, 1998) finding that young children are 
disproportionately at risk of homicide by step-parental males (more than 100 times more 
so).  Adler and Polk (2001) in their Australian study of child homicide also identify that 
when young children are killed it is often by their mother’s de facto partner (i.e. a young 
step-father figure) rather than at the hand of their biological fathers. Further support is 
provided by a recent more localized study of 127 child homicides carried out by the first 
author (Roach and Shepherd, 2010) where in the case of young child victims the mother’s 
de facto partner (i.e. the child’s non-biological father) was most commonly charged with 
their murder. British readers will be reminded of the tragic case of ‘Baby P’, where 
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seventeen month old Peter Connolly was killed by his mother, her de facto partner (and 
his brother) after months of sustained physical and emotional abuse1 
 
Research has uniformly shown that it is more common for older children to be killed by 
their biological fathers than by male step-parental figures. (Daly and Wilson, 1988, 1998; 
Adler and Polk, 2001) A common scenario is where the father attempts filicide-suicide, 
as response to a marriage break-up, separation from his children, or as an act of revenge 
against the mother (Adler and Polk, 2001). Mothers who kill older children appear 
generally to do so ‘to save’ them from a perceived life of misery, often by successful 
filicide-suicide. For mothers, revenge does not appear to be a motivating factor in the 
killing of their children. Love does (Adler and Polk, 2001).  
 
Mothers who kill their children appear to overwhelmingly do so within the child’s first 
year of life (neonaticide - within the first 24 hours being most common see Adler and 
Polk, 2001) Psychiatric illness is often deemed a mitigating circumstance (Adler and 
Polk, 2001: Roach and Shepherd, 2010).  
 
Traditional criminological explanations struggle to explain why, for example, young 
children are often more vulnerable to becoming victims of homicide at the hands of a 
step-parental figure than by a biological parent. Often quoted explanations for crime per 
se, such as deprivation and poor educational attainment, do not adequately explain, for 
example, why it is that step-parental figures from all social strata and educational 
backgrounds are consistently over-represented as perpetrators of child homicide. Indeed 
the problem of explaining why takes us back to the old problem of confusing correlates 
and causes. As we have endeavoured to show here in this short article, applying 
evolutionary thinking fares much better. 
 
Although our desire for British criminologists to incorporate evolutionary thinking into 
the current understandings and explanations for crime, we must not lose sight of our 
purpose with this article of preventing violence. Theoretical understanding may be one 
thing but practical application is another. What we find most worrying is that the 
illuminating research on child homicide discussed has not made its way to practitioners 
working in child protection arenas in the UK.  
 
From discussions with child social work colleagues, the authors are quite convinced that 
neither the work of Daly and Wilson, Adler and Polk, or any other like-minded research 
of child homicide (enlightened by evolutionary thinking) has made its way to those in the 
UK charged with the Hercuean task of working in child protection.  Our initial soundings 
suggest that this most enlightening research on child homicide has not been translated 
into prevention practice. The reason may be its origin, grounded in evolutionary thought 
dismissed out of hand. It may also be that there is a trade-off between child protection 
and the stigmatization of step-parents As for the first possible reason, miscomprehensions 
and misgivings about genes and behavior have probably prevented the dissemination and 
                                                 
1
 
http://media.education.gov.uk/assets/files/pdf/s/second%20serious%20case%20overview%20report%20rel
ating%20to%20peter%20connelly%20dated%20march%202009.pdf (accessed 14/04/2011) 
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adoption of such vital knowledge being put into practice by those working in child 
protection. If this proves to be the case then the most significant child homicide 
prevention measure we can propose is that those working in child protection, such a 
social workers and health visitors, be educated about this research and thinking as part of 
their training, and that the associated guides and literature incorporate it as a matter of 
urgency. Our plea to wider criminology, and most importantly to those practitioners 
charged with protecting children, is therefore, the same. In order to understand and 
prevent violence evolutionary thinking needs to be embraced.  
 
Violence Against Women 
 
According to the 2009/10 British Crime Survey (BCS) seven per cent of women aged 
between 16 and 59 years in England and Wales were victims of domestic abuse, 
compared with four per cent of men (Hall and Innes, 2011). The majority of the violence 
was described as ‘non-sexual’ abuse by a partner. Although only fourteen per cent of the 
total 2,087,000 violent incidents estimated by the BCS for that year were described as 
domestic violence, those that collected the data are careful to add a caveat proclaiming 
that equivalent figures have been found to be up to five times higher where participant 
‘self-completion’’ had been used instead of the BCS ‘face-to-face’ method (Hall and 
Innes, 2011).  
 
Our point is that it is the consensus that the prevalence and frequency of domestic 
violence are far greater than recorded crime statistics or the BCS suggest. Domestic 
violence is ubiquitous and as such if we are working to prevent violence than we can best 
make inroads by focussing on intimate partner violence. For example, a study in England 
and Wales (1995-2000) showed that 30 per cent of all the homicides were ‘femicides’. 
Moreover, 57 per cent of these female victims were killed by an intimate (or ex-intimate) 
male sexual partner (Brookman, 2005).  
 
How can an evolutionary informed violence prevention strategy help reduce domestic 
violence? The first step, as always, should be to try and understand what is going on. 
Let’s start with why men might go to war? 
 
Tooby and Cosmides provide an exquisite evolutionary psychology of warfare where 
they identify four essential conditions that must be met for adaptations to evolve that 
allow for initiating such coalitional aggression as war. They call these conditions ‘the risk 
contract of war’ - we draw the reader to their first condition: The average long-term gain 
in reproductive resources must be sufficiently large to outweigh the reproductive costs of 
engaging in warfare over evolutionary time. (Tooby and Cosmides, 1990) 
 
The most likely candidate is an increase in copulations as men have a great deal to gain if 
the result of engaging in war results in substantial increase in reproductive access to 
women. As Buss phrases it, 
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“Although few wars are initiated solely with the stated intent of capturing women, 
gaining more copulations is almost always viewed as a desired benefit of 
successfully vanquishing an enemy” (2004, p298).  
 
The work of Chagnon in his study of the warfare between the Yanomamö villager tribes 
lends support to this argument, where it was found to be nearly always linked to 
reproductive access to women (see Chagnon, 1983 for a very interesting anthropological 
study). We cannot resign the use of violence by men to secure female reproductive access 
to ‘less developed ‘societies. The mass rape of females by the victors has been an 
established part of warfare throughout history, with for example, the Norman invasion of 
1066, in the first and second world wars, and in the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. It 
might not be the primary motivating factor for men going to war but securing access to 
women is certainly part of the promise of reward.  The point being made, as it has been 
throughout this publication, is that males (especially young ones) will do whatever it 
takes to access females, regardless of the risks involved. 
 
Male ‘sexual jealousy’ is the most frequently given explanation for intimate partner 
violence (Dobash and Dobash, 1979; Daly and Wilson, 1988; Buss, 2000, 2005; Goetz, et 
al., 2008) and so will only be briefly mentioned here. For example, Polk refers to male on 
female violence as being primarily motivated by ‘jealousy/control’ on the part of the 
male (1994:18). Put simply, men appear to use violence against women as a tactic to 
restrict their sexual behaviour. Primarily as means of enforcing sexual (i.e. reproductive) 
‘exclusivity’ (Daly and Wilson, 1988; Wilson and Daly, 1996: Buss and Malamuth, 
1996). For example, Fiona Brookman found that more than 80 per cent of femicides 
occurred where the female was either planning to leave her partner, or where he 
perceived her at least to have been ‘unfaithful’ with another sexual intimate, thereby 
compromising sexual exclusivity (Brookman, 2000). Some suggest that violence against 
women is best understood as being ‘a behavioural output of male sexual jealousy (Goetz, 
et al., 2008: 67). Occasionally, that violence is lethal resulting in female homicide (Daly 
and Wilson, 1988; Polk, 1994).  
 
The foremost writer on this topic from an evolutionary perspective is Anne Campbell. 
Campbell makes the observation that in trying to explain the gender difference in crime 
the male-centered  approach has dominated evolutionary psychology, where there 
appears to be a broad consensus that the motivation to achieve status and ‘surplus 
resources’ is more critical to male than female reproductive success (Campbell, 2002, 
2009). However, where a female-centered approach is instead taken a different 
perspective on male on female violence is achieved;  
 
‘Her most important proximal goal is to stay alive because it is she who, given 
100 per cent maternal certainty, limited reproductive years and high replacement 
costs, has most to gain by ensuring that her offspring survive’ (Campbell 2009, 
p124). 
 
Reproduction (and therefore, by virtue, sexual intercourse), poses more of a risk to 
female safety and survival than for males (Campbell, 2009). Lew and colleagues rather 
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eloquently describes this as a male-female genetic arms race in which females must 
evolve defences against the lethal potential of the sex drive of males (Lew et al., 
2006).Intimate partner violence being one such defence as when women kill it is more 
often than not an intimate (or previously intimate) partner that is the victim (Daly and 
Wilson, 1988). 
 
So very briefly how can evolutionary thinking contribute to preventing domestic violence 
against women?  
 
The most obvious answer is that women who experience domestic violence should be 
encouraged not only to report it as soon as possible, but they must also be able to access 
immediate help, in order that they and their children ‘stay alive’. Research has 
consistently shown that a significant number of female victims of domestic homicide 
have experienced domestic violence previously (Wallace, 1986: Campbell, 1992; Smith 
et al., 1998). Lethal domestic violence against women being often the final tragedy in a 
long-running sequence of violent and emotional attacks by an intimate (or ex) partners. 
Mercifully, in the UK campaigns encouraging women to report domestic violence have 
been frequent and with some degree of success, hopefully exemplified by the year on 
year increase in recorded domestic violence incidents. Spousal homicide reflecting an 
extreme manifestation of the same basic conflicts that inspire sub-lethal marital violence 
on a much larger scale (Daly and Wilson, 1988; Brookman, 2005). 
 
 
The important finding domestic violence is generally perpetrated by males against female 
sexual intimates planning to leave them is also crucial with regards preventing violence 
against women. Research showing that a substantial proportion of femicides are 
connected to separation (or the threat of) support strongly the idea of male sexual 
proprietariness and the need for males to control female reproduction (Daly and Wilson, 
1988).  
 
We may not be able to predict on an individual basis whether domestic violence is likely 
to occur in specific households, but evolutionary thinking has highlighted when it is most 
likely to occur and who is the likely perpetrator. Such knowledge must be used to prevent 
the escalation to lethal violence by, for example, making it easier and more practical for 
women to leave their violent partners without fear of reprisal, as we know planning to 
leave is common flash-point in violence by men against women. We give Daly and 
Wilson a deserved last word; 
 
“Killing is just the tip of the iceberg: For every murdered wife, hundreds are 
beaten, coerced and intimidated. Although homicide probably does not often 
serve the interests of the perpetrator, it is far from clear that the same can be said 
of sub-lethal violence” (1988, p205). 
 
From Just So Stories to Evidence-Based Crime Reduction 
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Perhaps the first task is education of the next generation of criminologists. This is no 
small order given the accumulated hostility, sociological and religious and the complexity 
of modern evolutionary biology, whose mastery is a necessary condition of defensible 
contributions on violence prevention made by criminologists. Some are tentatively 
introducing Darwinian thinking into their books (see for example Wortley 2011) but they 
are rare, and the present writers stress their own inadequacies in treating with 
evolutionary biology writings. The Catch 22 is that the points of possible connection have 
to be simple enough to be comprehensible to a skeptical audience, which makes them 
vulnerable to accusations of superficiality and the Just So criticism. So what is presented 
below is a set of possibilities ranked from those which many criminologists may perhaps 
be prepared to consider to those which are currently regarded as difficult and alien.  
 
A further complication is that those measures which have most often proven effective in 
violence and harm reduction are situational in character, and hence are best addressed in 
the more sophisticated outcrops of Darwinian thinking. Laland and Brown (2002) 
distinguished four major contemporary approaches; human behavioural ecology, 
evolutionary psychology, memetics, and gene-culture co-evolution. The latter two adopt 
the meme concept, ie the unit for carrying cultural ideas, symbols, or practices, which can 
be transmitted from one mind to another, cultural analogues to genes, in that they self-
replicate, mutate, and respond to selective pressures. Changes in crime tactic memes co-
evolving with thresholds of inclination to aggress will certainly be necessary for short 
and middle-term variation in manifestations of violence.  
 
Returning to a desensitization process for criminologists, three stages may be envisaged.   
 
Defense mechanism analogies.  Just as the products Smoke Cloak and Smoke Bandit 
simulate the defence tactic of the squid, and the panic alarm can be regarded as 
equivalent to alarm calls, are there other analogues? Is defecation an effective last ditch 
tactic to avoid rape? Are there diversionary tactics to avoid attack on one’s family 
equivalent to birds feigning injury to divert predators from the nest? In what 
circumstances are mimicking less vulnerable species (as the hoverfly the wasp) relevant 
in avoiding violence (see Felson 2006 for some suggestions), Interesting criminologists in 
such questions may invite derision from evolutionary biologists, but may be a useful 
hook for criminological interest, and can be presented purely as what they are, namely no 
more than analogies.  
 
Bootstrapping on current interests. Places differ in their proneness to crime, including 
violent crime. One key variable appears to be the permeability of residential areas. Cul-
de-sacs (particularly sinuous cul-de-sacs) are massively less prone to victimization 
(Johnson and Bowers, 2010). Intuitively this is because people enter such roads because 
they live there or to visit. The have a reason they can express or defend. In evolutionary 
psychology, Dunbar’s number. Robin Dunbar (1992) surveyed village and tribe sizes and 
settled on 150 as the estimated size of a neolithic farming village; 150 as the splitting 
point of Hutterite settlements; 200 as the upper bound on the number of academics in a 
discipline's sub-specialization; 150 as the basic unit size of professional armies in Roman 
antiquity and in modern times since the 16th century; and notions of 
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appropriate company size. In short, he concluded that 150 was the neocortex-limited 
community size. Dunbar thinking could be applied to people recognition patterns by 
street network and layout to determine how they linked to patterns of assault and other 
victimization. The second writer was unfortunate to be present at a meeting of 
geographers and social scientists at a prestigious university at which the Dunbar number 
was introduced, to ill-deserved derisive laughter.  
 
A second possible avenue of infiltration is surely due for the trialing of child protection 
work on kin selection principles and Daly and Wilson research.  
 
Getting serious, this would consist of agent-based modeling of gene-meme coevolution 
models to assess fit to distributions of violence by time, place and person (see Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman (1981) for background. Such an approach would revolutionise 
criminal career understanding and preventive sentencing – but that would require 
persuading judges about evolutionary understanding of crime. That is perhaps a bridge 
too far to contemplate now.   
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